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INTRODUCTION
Allegations of ethical misconduct by lawyers have all but completely
overshadowed the substantive claims in the Chevron case. Although each side
has accused the other of flagrant wrongdoing, the charges against plaintiffs'
counsel appear to have captured more headlines and garnered more attention. 1

* Professor of Law and International Affairs, Penn State Law; Chair of Ethics, Regulation &
the Rule of Law, Queen Mary, University of London. For comments and input, I would like
to thank Gary Born, Chris Drahozal, Michael Goldhaber, Rick Marcus, Michael Mcllwrath,
Chris Mondics, Morris Ratner, and David Wilkins. I would also like to thank Benjamin Van
Noy and Alex Wiker for their excellent research assistance, the students of the Complex
Litigation Journal for organizing the conference that occasioned this Article, and to Matt
Woleske for his editorial support.
1. This Article does not take any position regarding the accuracy of or culpability for
alleged ethical misconduct by either plaintiff or defense counsel. There have been some
formal findings of misconduct by Chevron's counsel on relatively peripheral issues, but most
allegations are still subject to final judicial assessment. See Aguinda v. Chevron Corp., Case
No. 2003-0002, at 185-87 (Super. Ct. of Nueva Loja, Feb. 14, 2011) (Ecuador) [hereinafter
"Lago Agrio Judgment"] (issuing sanctions for a range of conduct, including failure to
appear at the exhibition of documents ordered and repeated motions on issues already ruled
upon and motions that by operation of law are inadmissible); Chevron v. Salazar No. 11
0691 LAK, 2011 WL 7112979, at *3 (D. Or. Nov. 30, 2011). (finding Chevron's conduct in
discovery "was, at least in part, meant to harass" and therefore sanctionable under Rule
45(c)(1) and awarding $32,945.20 in attorneys fees in favor of ELAW, a non-profit network
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The primary reason why the focus seems lopsided is that plaintiffs' counsel
were presumed to be the ones wearing white hats in this epic drama.
Mr. Steven Donziger, lead counsel for the plaintiffs, cast himself as the
daring hero in a tale that resembles the stark morality of an old spaghetti
Western. In Chevron, the roles of good guys and bad guys were indelibly cast
in a compelling story of romanticized victims who had suffered terrible harms
at the hands of a mustache-twirling corporate monolith. The irony, of course, is
that now, instead of being plaintiffs' greatest champion, plaintiffs' lead attorney
appears to be their greatest obstacle to obtaining compensation for their alleged
harms.
The allegations leveled against plaintiffs' counsel also receive
disproportionate focus because they were captured on film by a documentary
filmmaker who, piling on the irony, had originally aimed at presenting a
particularly sympathetic portrayal of plaintiffs' case. Instead of focusing public
attention on an "Amazon Chernobyl, ' 2 however, the film instead became a
battleground for allegations of plaintiffs' counsel's alleged misconduct.
Outtakes from the film are now among Chevron's most powerful weapons
against enforcement of the $18 billion judgment from the Ecuador because they
document the alleged ethical misconduct by plaintiffs' counsel.
This Article explores structural and institutional reasons why alleged
ethical violations are not simply an ironic epilogue in this case, but an
occupational hazard for plaintiffs' counsel in transnational class actions more
generally. Some of the reasons for these special challenges, explored in Part I,
relate to the relative size and newness of plaintiff firms to transnational legal
practice, particularly in comparison to the legal conglomerates that generally
represent multi-national defendants. Additional reasons, which are the topic of
Part II, are inherent in the international nature of the Chevron case.
Transnational class litigation destabilizes the essential cornerstones of
attorneys' ethical obligations to both clients and the legal system. This
untethering from the essential foundations of legal ethics complicates the
already uncertain and often irrational choice-of-law questions regarding which
ethical rules apply to conduct abroad in such cases. In Part III, I explain how
the politicization of high-profile transnational class litigation can add to the
ethical perils already present. Finally, in conclusion, I offer a few observations
about lessons for attorneys and regulators to insulate future transnational
litigation from the problems and perils that have undermined the search for
justice in Chevron.

of environmental lawyers).
2. Festival
Updates
My
Premier:
CRUDE,
SUNDANCE
CHANNEL,
http://www.sundancechannel.com/blog/2009/01/festival-updates-my-premiere-crude/
(last
visited July 5, 2013).
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ASYMMETRICAL ETHICAL RISKS IN TRANSNATIONAL CLASS LITIGATION

Plaintiffs' counsel confront asymmetrical ethical risks in transnational
litigation. 3 Some reasons for this asymmetry relate to the nature of international
litigation and others to the history, demographics, and logistics of transnational
legal practice more generally.
Transnational litigation does not simply involve parties from different legal
systems. It inevitably involves interaction among multiple national legal
systems. This interaction often translates into complex interrelationships among
the law, procedures, politics, and legal cultures of different jurisdictions.
Effective representation of clients in transnational litigation therefore requires
not only a passport and a plane ticket, but "knowledge about the relevant
foreign procedure, institutions, and jurisprudential values .... 4
The necessary skills and knowledge for this type of practice were not
historically taught in law schools, and are not easy to acquire except through
direct experience. Moreover, bar authorities have only recently come to
appreciate the need to regulate such practice, but historically provided little
guidance or oversight. This Part explains how that regulatory void has created
potential perils for plaintiffs' counsel in transnational litigation.
A.

InternationalAdHoc-ism

If litigation can be analogized to chess, transnational litigation is like threedimensional chess, but with profoundly different cultural and legal rules
applying on each board.5 Players who enter the game without a meaningful
appreciation of these complexities can find themselves not only at a strategic
disadvantage, but at a heightened risk of violating unknown rules or known
rules whose application or interpretation is uncertain in a transnational setting.
Attorneys new to transnational litigation have more than occasionally
found themselves inadvertently violating foreign local laws or customs. For
instance, U.S. attorneys have been arrested or fined for engaging in such
seeming banalities as serving process or taking depositions abroad because they6
did not know that such practices were illegal in certain foreign jurisdictions.
3. Although legitimate distinctions can be drawn between "transnational" and

"international" litigation and legal practice, this Article uses the terms interchangeably. For
the sake of simplicity, this Article refers to the "Chevron case," though in fact it is not a
single case, but multiple, inter-related disputes being pursued in various national and
international venues.
4. Samuel P. Baumgartner, Class Actions and Group Litigation in Switzerland, 27
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 301, 303 (2007).
5. Gary Born refers to these problems collectively as "the peculiar uncertainties of
transnational litigation." GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 31-32
(2009).
6. Service
of
Legal
Documents
Abroad,
U.S.
DEPT.
OF
STATE,
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More complex ethical and practical issues arise in jurisdictions in which the
rule of law is not firmly entrenched and corruption is common in judicial and
legal institutions. In addition to creating challenges for U.S. attorneys, these
risks also put a premium on selecting effective and reliable local counsel. Even
that relatively simple task, however, can be a challenging proposition and trap
for the unwary.
Plaintiffs' firms find themselves at greater risk because they tend to be
considerably smaller than firms that represent corporate clients. "Plaintiffs are
rarely represented by the many lawyer mega-firms that generally represent
national and multi-national corporations." 7 Apart from a few counter-examples,
"[t]he largest plaintiffs' firms employ fewer than one hundred lawyers, and the
typical firm employs fewer than ten." 8 It is relatively unusual for attorneys in
smaller firms, and particularly those who specialize in a practice as uniquely
American as class action litigation, to have extensive experience with foreign
legal systems or maintain professional networks abroad.
Instead, smaller plaintiff firms generally engage in overseas activities on an
ad hoc basis in response to specific client needs. By all accounts, for example,
Chevron was the first international litigation for plaintiffs' U.S. counsel.
Similarly, Bhopal, another transnational litigation case involving accusations of
ethical misconduct, was a first for most of plaintiffs' counsel. As newbies,
plaintiffs' counsel tend to respond to the complex cultural, procedural, and
ethical issues that arise in transnational litigation as practical problems to be
resolved on an individualized basis and as they arise in the context of pursuing
their clients' case strategy. In sum, when plaintiffs' counsel take up a
transnational litigation case, they are usually more like 'accidental tourists'
than savvy travelers.
While corporate law firms can face similar challenges, their learning curve
began long ago and by now they can anticipate many of the problems that
would otherwise be a surprise to the newly initiated. Moreover, large multinational law firms that represent corporate clients also have several structural
and institutional advantages, described in the next section, which helped flatten
the otherwise steep curve.

http://travel.state.gov/law/judicial/judicial_680.html (last visited July 5, 2013) ("It may be
prudent to consult local foreign counsel early in the process on this point. American process

servers and other agents may not be authorized by the laws of the foreign country to effect
service abroad, and such action could result in their arrest and/or deportation.").
7. Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Essentials OfDemocratic Mass Litigation, 45 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 499 (2012). This profile may be changing. See Morris Ratner, A New
Model ofPlaintiffs' Class Action Counsel, 31 REv. LINIG. 1 (2012) (arguing that some of the
leading class action law firms are "relatively large and internally complex").
8. Id.
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B. Structuraland institutionalDifferences
The ad hoc-ism that most often characterizes plaintiffs' counsel's efforts in
transnational litigation contrasts sharply with the comprehensive case
management and law firm management strategies employed by most
multinational firms. These firms are usually somewhere between huge and
gigantic. 9 But this is not simply another David-Meets-Goliath situation. Multinational law firms are not only bigger; they are, for the most part, also more
geographically diverse, culturally agile, and transnationally experienced than
their plaintiff-firm counterparts.
To take just a few representative statistics, since 2000, "the 250 largest
U.S.-based law firms have more than doubled the number of lawyers in Europe
and increased their headcount in Asia by more than sixty percent." 10 Most of
the attorneys employed in these outlying offices have their primary legal
education and licensing in a foreign jurisdiction, 11 and they work integrally
with U.S. attorneys in the same office 12 and within the larger firm. These
institutional structures and related networks provide numerous advantages for
corporate firms in transnational litigation,
even down to something as
13
preliminary as identifying local counsel.
Corporate law firms also usually have experience with, and internal
procedures for responding to, issues of corruption and legal instability in
jurisdictions in which the rule of law is not firmly entrenched. The structure of
a large-multinational law firm means that misconduct in one jurisdiction may
affect the firm as whole, either through liability, 14 regulatory sanction, or
damage to its reputation. Policies for avoiding these potential problems are
often conceived of and implemented as self-interested risk-management
strategies.

9. David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the Corporate
Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 2067, 2089-90 (2010) (documenting the
how "the median size of the nation's 250 largest firms ha[s] ballooned" in recent years).
10. Id. at 2080.
11. Carol Silver et al., Between Diffusion and Distinctiveness in Globalization: U.S.
Law Firms Go Glocal, 22 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1431, 1448-51 (2009).
12. Id. at 1450.
13. "According to the Global Counsel Survey, 74% of respondents indicated that when
seeking outside counsel in a country where they do not have an established relationship, inhouse lawyers start by asking someone they know, including in-house lawyers at other
companies and current local counsel with international offices and capabilities." See
LExISNEXIS, 2011 Global Corporate Counsel Survey: Selecting Outside Counsel in Foreign
Jurisdictions 10, available at http://www.lexmundi.com/ccsurvey20l1 (cited in THOMAS A.
DECKER, LAWRENCE T. HOYLE, JR. & ARLENE FICKLER, 1 SUCCESSFUL PARTNERING BETWEEN
INSIDE AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL § 4:21 (2012)).
14. Complaint, Watts Water Tech. v. Sidley Austin LLP, No. 0004847-12 (D.C.
Super. Ct. June 6, 2012) (alleging that law firm failed in due diligence to alert client of
potential FCPA issue in acquisition of a Chinese company).
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In sum, large multi-national law firms have a complex set of skills,
resources, and self-interested incentives for avoiding violations of local laws in
foreign jurisdictions or getting caught up in corruption. Together, these
resources may make them less inclined to ethical deviations in the heat of
pursuing client goals. 15
All this is not to say that large firms do not have their own limitations on
competence, cultural blinders, and countervailing incentives (discussed in
greater detail below) that mean they too engage in lawless or unethical behavior
in order to promote client interests. Despite the potential effect of
countervailing incentives, however, these firms generally have a better sense of
where, in foreign jurisdiction, the line is between conduct that legal and illegal,
or ethical and unethical. They also have a clearer self-interest in staying on the
right side of that line. As a result, these firms are arguably better able to adjust
their conduct to avoid inadvertent or counter-productive transgressions in
transnational litigation than their plaintiff law firm counterparts.
C. Regulatory Void
The ethical naivety that can characterize legal adventurism abroad has been
facilitated, if not encouraged, by a historic indifference of bar authorities and
the resulting regulatory void. The apparent absence of any meaningful
professional regulation when attorneys cross borders means that attorneys have
little or no incentive to analyze and assess potential ethical issues in
transnational legal practice. Meanwhile, even well-intentioned attorneys have
few tools to self-assess in the absence of any meaningful guidance by bar
authorities.
One of the most prominent examples of what happens in a regulatory void
occurred in the aftermath of the disastrous gas leak at the Union Carbide
facility in Bhopal, India in 1984. Within hours after gruesome details became
public, dozens of American attorneys descended en masse on distressed,
unsophisticated, and often illiterate Indian victims. U.S. attorneys directly
solicited victims and convinced them to sign contingent fee retainer agreements
for tort actions to be brought in the United States.
The fact that many victims did not speak English or understand what the
agreements were did not obviously influence attorneys' efforts. One attorney
boasted that he had obtained more than 7,000 signed contingency fee
agreements within five working days of the gas leak, meaning approximately

15. Milton C. Regan, Jr., Risky Business, 94 GEo. L.J. 1957, 1966 (2006) (arguing that
"conceptualizing ethics as a matter of avoiding liability can influence dispositions, attitudes,
and motives, and, therefore, how someone exercises her [ethical] discretion"); see also
William H. Simon, The Ethics Teacher's BittersweetRevenge: Virtue and Risk Management,
94 GEO. L.J. 1985 (2006).
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one agreement every 60 seconds. 16 These events became known as the Greatest
Ambulance Chase in History. They were in apparent violation
of several U.S.
17
ethical rules, and in clear violation of Indian ethical rules.
Despite the obvious ethical violations, 18 neither bar authorities in India nor
the United States ever sought to discipline these attorneys. 19 Whatever other
reasons may have contributed, one explanation for this inaction was likely that
none of the relevant regulatory authorities regarded the attorney conduct at
issue as within the purview of their disciplinary power. For the American
authorities, their rules and disciplinary jurisdiction did not apply overseas in
1984. 2 0 For the Indian authorities, their ethical rules
did not apply to attorneys
21
acting in court cases pending in the United States.
In 2002, the American Bar Association finally extended application of the
Model Rules to transnational practice. It did so by taking an already
problematic choice-of-law rule designed to deal with domestic multijurisdictional practice and extending it, through a minor revision to the
Comments, to international law practice. As a result of this rather haphazard
amendment, Rule 8.5 contains a number
of ambiguities that are uniquely
22
problematic in transnational litigation.

16. David T. Austern, Is Lawyer Solicitation ofBhopal ClientsEthical?, LEGAL TIMES,
Jan. 21, 1985, at 16. "In the Bhopal litigation, for example, one American attorney managed
to obtain retainer agreements from over 7,000 individual clients in less than a week; other
individual attorneys claimed to represent as many as 57,000 clients." John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Regulation of EntrepreneurialLitigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large
Class Action, 54 U. Cm. L. REV. 877, 886 (1987).
17. In India there was "an absolute bar" on attorney advertising and solicitation, which
would even preclude Indian attorneys from being listed on a referral website. Michael A.
Gollin, Answering the Call: Public Interest Intellectual Advisors, 17 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y
187, 209 (2005).
18. See id.; Bhopal Isfor Lawyers, NAT'L REV., Jan. 11, 1985, at 20.
19. Perceptions of opportunism by U.S. attorneys may have contributed to India's
decision to become the sole representative of the Bhopal victims and its opposition to any
compensation being paid to attorneys who initiated the cases in the United States.
20. For an extended discussion of the jurisdiction and choice-of-law issues related to
regulation of U.S. attorneys engaged in law practice outside the United States, see Catherine
A. Rogers, Lawyers Without Borders, 30 U. PA. INT'L L. REV. 1035 (2009).
21. Contingency fees are generally prohibited in most other countries, although
recently there has been some softening as many European jurisdictions are exploring. Mark
A. Behrens et al., GlobalLitigationTrends, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 165, 183-84 (2009).
22. The relevant text of Rule 8.5 is as follows:
(a) Disciplinary Authority. A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the
disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the lawyer's conduct occurs. A
lawyer not admitted in this jurisdiction is also subject to the disciplinary authority of this
jurisdiction if the lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal services in this jurisdiction.
A lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of both this jurisdiction and another
jurisdiction for the same conduct.
(b) Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, the rules
of professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows:
(1) for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the
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At a literal level, Model Rule 8.5 subjects counsel to rules of a foreign
jurisdiction whenever the conduct is "in connection with a matter pending
before a tribunal" in that jurisdiction. 23 It is uncertain whether this rule would
apply when the "connection" to a pending case is only coordination and
publicity-related activities, not actual court appearances, as was the case for
plaintiffs' counsel in the Ecuadorian proceedings in Chevron. In addition, the
language and drafting history of the Rule 8.5 are similarly ambiguous about
which rules apply to conduct related to a "matter" that is being litigated in
multiple parallel proceedings in national and international venues, which
is
24
often the case in transnational litigation and certainly the case in Chevron.
Another, more structural concern with Rule 8.5 is that it adopts a very
crude omnibus choice-of-law approach to ethical rules. Apart from producing
some peculiar substantive outcomes, this approach obviates the need for
attorneys to exercise any professional judgment in identifying and interpreting
their ethical obligations.
Attorneys may sometimes be justified in violating foreign law. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure expressly contemplate this possibility, with the
approval of a court, if the foreign law would significantly impede or prevent a
just result in a U.S. legal proceeding. 25 Rule 8.5, however, does not simply
allow for the possibility that a violation of foreign laws or ethical rules can
sometimes be justified.2 6 Instead, Rule 8.5 implicitly authorizes attorneys to
violate-with ethical impunity-foreign laws and rules. This authorization
comes without any obligation that attorneys expend even a moment of
professional reflection in assessing the value of the prescribed activity to the
case or the relative importance of the foreign law or ethical rule being violated.
For example, in a case like Bhopal, because the action was pending in a U.S.
court, under Rule 8.5, attorneys need only consider the permissibility of
Bhopal-style advertising under U.S. ethical rules, and are not required to
jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise.
MODEL RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT 8.5 (2002). For a discussion of the ambiguities in the text
and its application to international contexts, see generally Rogers, supra note 20.

23. For an extended analysis of the ambiguities regarding the term "matter" and phrase
"in connection with" in Rule 8.5, see Rogers, supra note 20, at 1056-57.
24. Notably, Model Rule 8.5 did not apply to plaintiffs' lead counsel in Chevron. He
was licensed in New York, which has adopted a different choice-of-law rule that made him
subject to New York ethical rules. New York Rule 8.5(b)(1) is limited to courts in which an
attorney is admitted to practice (either generally or pro hac vice). As a result, under New
York Rule 8.5(b)(2), New York ethical rules continue to apply to an attorney's conduct
connected to foreign proceedings in which the attorney is not licensed.
25. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3) (authorizing service by other means not prohibited
by international agreement, as the court orders" including means prohibited by a foreign
country's law).

26. For further discussion of the need for attorney discretion in navigating ethical
obligations when conduct implicates multiple jurisdictions, see Rogers, supra note 20, at
1059-61.
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consider at all the fact such conduct is illegal and unethical in India.
The best that can be said about Model Rule 8.5 is that it represents the
ABA's recognition that U.S. bar authorities can and should play a role in
regulating attorney conduct abroad. In this regard, it puts attorneys on notice
that they may be subject to discipline at home for misconduct abroad. Rule 8.5
does not, however, provide meaningful guidance about which rules apply in
transnational litigation or how attorneys should understand their ethical duties.
The reasons for these inadequacies are not simply because of ambiguities in the
text of the rule, but in special challenges that are raised in regulating
transnational legal practice, particularly in transnational litigation, which are
described in greater detail in the next part.
II.

WOBBLY ETHICAL CORNERSTONES

In addition to practical and institutional challenges, described above,
plaintiffs' counsel also face heightened ethical challenges because the two
essential cornerstones of attorney ethics-duties of loyalty to the client and
duties as officers of the court27-rest on infirm ground in transnational class
litigation. While creating risks for both sides, for the reasons described below,
the resulting instability is particularly perilous for plaintiffs' counsel.
A. Loyalty to Clients
Even in domestic cases, class actions invert the conventional structure of
the attorney-client agency relationship with respect to plaintiffs' counsel. Class
29
2
litigation is often lawyer-initiated 8 and lawyer-driven:
Unlike most litigation, where an injured claimant seeks the attorney, in class

27. "In addition to being faithful agents who pursued their client's interests, lawyers
have traditionally also been expected to be "officers of the court" who promote and uphold
the public purposes of the legal framework." Id. As Wilkins notes, the old Model Code
typified this view in stating that "[t]he duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal
system, is to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law." See MODEL CODE
OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
28. Victor E. Schwartz et al., Federal Courts Should Decide Interstate Class Actions:
A Call for FederalClass Action Diversity Jurisdiction Reform, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 483,
492 (2001) (stating that "many [class actions] arise simply as a result of the creativity of
entrepreneurial contingency fee lawyers" and noting that, in one newspaper report of
Alabama class action, "'plaintiffs had no plans to sue, and no idea they might have cause to,
until a lawyer or a friend of a lawyer told them they'd been wronged').
29. Edward Brunet, Improving Class Action Efficiency by Expanded Use of Parens
Patriae Suits and Intervention, 74 TUL. L. REv. 1919, 1929 (2000) ("The normal lawsuit
might involve the typical agency-principal relationship in which the client is the principal
and the attorney the agent. In contrast, the class action reverses these roles because the client
takes on attributes of an agent and the entrepreneurial attorney seems to be in the position of
a principal.").

496

STANFORD JOURNAL OF COMPLEX LITIGATION

[Vol. 1:2

actions, the attorney seeks the claimants. From the initial investigation of a
claim, to
class certification, and finally settlement, class actions are attorney30
driven.

The consequence is that plaintiff lawyers in class actions generally have a
greater stake in the outcome of the case than their clients and, relatedly,
exercise greater control over case strategy at critical junctures.
Based on these features, plaintiffs' counsel in cases such as securities
fraud, consumer fraud, and toxic tort class actions have been dubbed 'bounty
hunters.' 3 1 The term signals that their primary interest in class litigation is
entrepreneurial and self-interested, even if their activities provide incidental
benefits for their clients and the public good. In these cases, "individual
plaintiffs have weak to nonexistent control over their attorneys across the mass
tort context for reasons that are inherent to the economics of mass tort
litigation." 32 This dilution of client control raises numerous potential ethical
hazards regarding
client loyalty, which have been well-documented by various
33
commentators.
A similar inversion of the agency relationship also occurs with cause
lawyers who bring aggregate public interest litigation. As David Luban
explains, the cause lawyer is a double agent: "[T]he lawyer is an agent for both
the client and the cause" and as a result faces a "kind of dirty hands dilemma"
when the interests of one subset of claimants differs from the political
objectives of other claimants or the lawyers. 34 Cause lawyers often serve as
leaders of emerging movements and focus more on improving the movement's
position in society through litigation than on the interests of individual clients'

30. Mobsen Manesh, Note, The New Class Action Rule: Procedural Reforms in an
Ethical Vacuum, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 923, 924-25 (2005); see also Martin H. Redish,
Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of Private
Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 77-83 (2003) (concluding that many
class actions are attorney driven and amount "to little more than private attorneys acting as
bounty hunters").
31. John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the
Lawyer As Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L REV 215, 218 (1983)
32. John Beisner, Class Action "'Cops":Public Servants or Private Entrepreneurs?,
57 STAN. L. REv. 1441 (2005); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass
Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1462 (1995) (writing critically of results in
mass tort class actions); Charles W. Wolfram, Mass Torts Messy Ethics, 80 CORNELL L.
REv. 1228, 1231 (1995).
33. Jasminka Kalajdzic, Self-Interest, Public Interest, and the Interests of the Absent
Client: Legal Ethics and Class Action Praxis, 49 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 1, 13-24 (2011)
(discussing a similar issue under Canadian law); Natalie C. Scott, Don't Forget Me! The
Client in a Class Action Lawsuit, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 561, 573-83 (2002); David L.
Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 924,
929, 939-40 (1998).
34. DAVID LUBAN, THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 319

(1983)
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interests and need.35 Although the reasons are different, cause lawyers in
transnational class litigation may face an attenuation of client loyalty similar to
bounty-hunter lawyers.
In domestic litigation, important checks exist to counterbalance the
attenuation of client loyalty that occurs in class actions and public interest
aggregate litigation. Judges experienced with class actions provide "close...
scrutiny of counsel's conduct and [demonstrate] a lack of tolerance for any
significant appearance of impropriety." 36 This judicial oversight is
institutionalized in rules regarding in class certification, pleading standards, and
settlement, all of which have been tinkered with over the 60-year history of
class actions and aggregate litigation. 37 In addition to these structural controls,
in domestic contexts 38
clients can file claims with bar disciplinary authorities,
even if they rarely do.
These various mechanisms provide institutional safeguards-however
muted-to protect client interests when client loyalty is attenuated. Client
control in domestic class actions is diluted and attenuated, but not utterly
impossible.
In transnational class actions, judicial oversight and client control is closer
to a real impossibility. As a starting point, as described in greater below, 39 few
foreign systems have a similarly extensive history of experimentation with
class actions that produced the admittedly weak, but nevertheless important,
client safeguards that exist in the United States. This institutional hole is
especially gaping in foreign systems, described in greater detail below, that
adopt class or aggregate claim procedures hastily and in response to dismissals
from the U.S. courts under forum non conveniens. As a result, difficult
obstacles to protecting client loyalty obligations in the United States become
insurmountable hurdles in foreign class actions.
In addition to structural challenges to judicial control in international class
action and aggregate litigation, the prospect of clients exercising any control is
also further diluted. The lack of incentives that individual class members have
in domestic litigation is aggravated by linguistic, cultural, geographic, and

35. Michael McCann & Helen Silverstein, Rethinking Law's "Allurement": A
RelationalAnalysis of Social Movement Lawyers in the United States, in CAUSE LAWYERING:
POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 261 (Austin Sarat & Stuart
A. Schieingold eds., 1998).
36. Ronald E. Mallen and Jeffrey M. Smith with Allison D. Rhodes, 2 LEGAL
MALPRACTICE § 17:7 (2013 ed.).
37. Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and
Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 48 (1975) (explaining and surveying policies for
reforming class action rules); Max Helveston, Promoting Justice Through Public Interest
Advocacy in Class Actions, 60 BUFF. L. REv. 749 (2012) (tracing history of class action).
38. Deborah L. Rhode, InstitutionalizingEthics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 665, 694
(1994).
39. See infra notes 62-76, and accompanying text.
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informational barriers that exist in transnational settings.
These risks have, according to the intervenors in Chevron, metastasized
into reality. Even in the abstract, it would be difficult to imagine clients from an
indigenous rainforest community in the Ecuadorian jungle complaining to the
New York bar about an attorney who may be the clients' only connection to
New York or the U.S. legal system. Such clients would be unlikely to even
know that such a mechanism exists, or could be invoked by foreign clients. The
ultimate attenuation of client control in Chevron, however, occurred upon
transfer of the case back to Ecuador.
The case was originally brought in the United States to provide remedies
for personal injury claims. When the case was refiled in Ecuador, however, it
became an environmental cleanup case. 40 Individual clients were effectively
replaced with an organization that purported to represent their interests, but
whose exact nature and relationship to individual clients is difficult to discern
from public records.
Judith Kimerling, a law professor at City University of New York and
author Amazon Crude, the book that is touted as having brought problems
underlying the Chevron litigation to light, has represented members of the
Huaorani community of Ecuador. Members of the Huaorani tribe appear to
have credible, compelling claims of personal injury attributable to Chevron's
(then-Texaco's) activities in Ecuador and were originally part of the Alien Tort
case brought in the United States. According to Kimerling, however, now the
tribe members "have reason to believe" that the Donziger-led team "will not
properly distribute any portion of the judgment proceeds to compensate,
mitigate, and remediate the harm to [the] plaintiffs.'
Although arguably the Huaorani and other individual plaintiffs' interests
were harmed by the alleged misconduct by counsel, they never raised questions
of ethical misconduct. It was instead Chevron that raised these questions, and
later Professor Kimerling as part of her efforts to intervene in U.S. proceedings
on behalf of individual Huaorani plaintiffs. Perhaps most importantly, the
alleged misconduct only came to light when the case was 're-domesticated' to
U.S. courts in Section 1782 proceedings and an action to enforce the judgment.

40. This transformation is in part tied to the fact that class actions per se are not
recognized in Ecuador. The procedures that facilitated claims against Chevron were
introduced through legislative reforms but, as noted below, those reforms were orchestrated
by plaintiffs' counsel. There is no available record for why the legal reforms focused on
enabling environmental clean-up claims instead of class litigation to vindicate personal
injury claims. It might be imagined, however, that larger dollar values attached to the former
rather than the latter and the prospect of a larger recovery provided some incentive for the
choice among reform options.
41. Paul M. Barrett, The Chevron Oil Pollution Mess Gets Messier, FORBES, July 25,
2012, available at http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-07-24/the-chevron-oilpollution-mess-gets-messier

Spring 2013]

WHEN BAD GUYS ARE WEARING WHITE HATS

For large corporate clients such as Chevron, there is no similar risk of
attenuated client control. Instead, the opposite may be true. "When [corporate]
clients are dissatisfied, they can afford to change attorneys, negotiate for a
reduction in fees, or litigate." 42 Unlike individual plaintiffs, corporate clients
do not generally need bar authorities to ensure their attorneys abide by client
loyalty obligations.
The risk instead is that law firms representing multi-national companies
will be excessively committed to client objectives. As David Wilkins describes,
43
the nature of corporate representation turns "the agency model in its head.
Wilkins posits that "[b]y withholding information and manipulating incentives,
sophisticated corporate clients now have the power to pressure their lawyers
into taking risky or unethical actions that threaten to throw their law firms 'into
confusion' in the form of legal peril or financial ruin." 44 While corporate
attorneys will seek to avoid putting their firms in peril, pressures from clients
that represent a significant portion of the firm's revenues undoubtedly can and
have clouded attorneys' ethical judgment. Notably, the most cavalier
statements by Mr. Donziger have a fight-fire-with-fire sense of urgency to
them, suggesting that he believed he was dealing with counsel who had crossed
45
ethical lines on behalf of a big corporate client.
B. Duties as Officers of the Court
Turning to an attorney's role as officer of the court, transnational class
actions such as Chevron have a similarly destabilizing effect on this essential
cornerstone. When a case such as Chevron is dismissed from U.S. courts under
the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a change in representation necessarily
and inevitably results. Attorneys are licensed and admitted to practice in one or
more national legal systems. As noted above, plaintiffs' counsel are seldom
licensed in foreign jurisdictions and even large corporate firms almost always
rely on locally licensed attorneys in foreign proceedings. As a consequence,
when transnational litigation is dismissed from U.S. courts and sent to a foreign
jurisdiction, U.S. counsel become professionally untethered from any court

42. STATE BAR OF CAL., INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF DISCIPLINARY
COMPLAINTS AGAINST ATTORNEYS IN SOLO PRACTICE, SMALL SIZE LAW FIRMS AND LARGE
SIZE LAW FIRMS (June 2001) (cited in Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Ted Schneyer, Regulatory
Controls on Large Law Firms: A Comparative Perspective, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 593, 599 n.24
(2002)).
43. See Wilkins, supra note 9, at 2072.
44. See id. While this Article focuses primarily on alleged misconduct of plaintiffs'
counsel, Professor Wilkins' explanation of the inversion of the agency model raises other
potentially significant quandaries for the defense side in transnational litigation that are
worthy of future exploration.
45. See, e.g., infra note 48, and accompanying text.
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proceedings. They may continue to serve as lawyers for their clients, but their
role, as perceived by others and even themselves, is decidedly different.
Lead plaintiffs' counsel in Chevron seems to be a good example. After
dismissal from U.S. courts, news reports continued to refer to Mr. Donziger as
"plaintiffs' counsel."4 6 At least for that period when no related actions were
pending in U.S. courts, however, Mr. Donziger was not formally counsel of
record for plaintiffs 47
anywhere. He was not licensed in Ecuador nor admitted to
appearpro hac vice.
The disengagement of plaintiffs' attorney from any court proceedings
raised questions, even for plaintiffs' own counsel, whether he was acting as an
attorney for plaintiffs in work related to the Ecuadorian proceedings. For
example, in an outtake caught on film, Mr. Donziger stated:
The only language that I believe this judge is going to understand is one of
pressure, intimidation and humiliation ....As a lawyer, I never do this. You
don't have to do this in the United States.
It's dirty ....It's necessary. I'm not
48

letting them get away with this stuff.
The negative implication of the emphasized phrase seems to be that the speaker
does not consider himself to be acting as a lawyer in the proceedings in
Ecuador.
This apparent understanding of his own role seems consistent with the
view of one of plaintiffs' Ecuadorian attorneys, who wrote in an email to Mr.
Donziger regarding disclosure of emails in U.S. litigation about the prospect
that "all of us, your attorneys [in Ecuador], might go to jail.",49 The emphasized

46. See, e.g., Walter Olson, Chevron can depose opposing lawyer in Ecuador case,
OVERLAWYERED (Oct. 24, 2010), http://overlawyered.com/2010/10/chevron-can-deposeopposing-lawyer-in-ecuador-case/; see also Daniel Fisher, Chevron Says Plaintiff
efYered
Ecuador
Judge
$500,000
For
Verdict,
FORBES,
Jan.
28,
2013,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2013/01/28/chevron-says-plaintiffs-offeredecuador-judge-500000-for-verdict/ (summarizing Chevron's accusation that plaintiff
lawyers, led by Donziger, bribed and offered to bribe an Ecuadorian judge to allow them to
ghost write his opinion); Peter S. Lubin & Vincent L. DiTommaso, A New York City Federal
Judge Allows Chevron to Depose Opposing Counsel, CHICAGO Bus. LITIG. LAWYER BLOG
(Oct. 30, 2010), http://www.chicagobusinesslitigationlawyerblog.com/2010/10/a-new york
cityfederaljudge.html (using evidence from the documentary Crude to show how
"plaintiffs' counsel," Donziger, worked with a court expert on the case).
47. Daniel Fisher, Kaplan Orders Deposition of Attorney Donziger in Chevron
Ecuador Case, FORBES, Oct. 21, 2010, http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2010/
10/21/kaplan-orders-deposition-of-attomey-donziger-in-chevron-ecuador-case/
(explaining
how Donziger cannot directly represent Amazonian villagers since he is not licensed to
practice law in Ecuador); see also Adam Klasfeld, Chevron Gets RestrainingOrder for Trial
in Ecuador, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV., Feb. 8, 2011, http://www.courthousenews.
com/2011/02/08/34014.htm (clarifying that Steven Donziger is an attorney licensed to
practice in New York).
48. In re Chevron Corp., 749 F. Supp. 2d 141, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) qf'd sub nom.
Lago Agrio Plaintiffs v. Chevron Corp., 409 F. App'x 393 (2d Cir. 2010) (emphasis added).
49. E-mail from Julio Prieto to Steve Donziger, et al., (Mar. 30, 2010, 2:02 PM)
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language seems to imply that the email's author regarded the recipient not
functioning as an attorney in the case in Ecuador, but rather as a supervisor or
employer of local attorneys. Under this interpretation, the email suggests that
Mr. Donziger would be beyond the reach of Ecuadorian courts.
The apparent ambiguity of Mr. Donziger's role was not lost on Chevron.
Seeing a potential opportunity, Chevron argued that because he was primarily
engaged in "fund-raising and publicity, rather than lawyering," Mr. Donziger
could not invoke the attorney-client privilege.50 Despite appearances and
ambiguities, Mr. Donziger was undoubtedly still performing legal services for
clients and therefore acting as their attorney.
It is not unusual, and arguably it is even necessary, for attorneys on both
sides in high-profile mass tort litigation to manage publicity. Even when not
technically counsel of record in any pending case, Mr. Donziger's activities
were much like coordinating counsel in complex multi-jurisdictional litigation
in the United States. Coordinating counsel are often, but not always, designated
as counsel of record and admitted pro hac vice in various jurisdictions. Even if
they are not actually designated as counsel of record, however, that fact does
not eliminate the existence of an attorney-client relationship, though it may
affect, under Rule 8.5, which ethical rules apply to their conduct.
Even if still acting as counsel, however, the unmooring of coordinating
counsel from any particular court, even in domestic cases, raises legitimate
concerns that they may apply improper pressure on local counsel to behave
unethically. 5 1 In a related vein, attorneys who take on a role that primarily
involves coordination and publicity raise concerns that they may become
"preoccupied with self-aggrandizement" at the expense of their client's
interests.5 2 These risks in domestic settings are manageable, however, because
attorneys are still unambiguously bound by local ethical rules, many of which
impose obligations to the legal system even when an attorney is not formally
appearing in any court proceedings.
For example, under Model Rule 3.6, an attorney who "is participating or
has participated in ... a litigation shall not make an extrajudicial statement that
the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of
(emphasis added) available at http://www.theamazonpost.com/wp-content/uploads/FACEx. -11.pdf.
50. Patrick Radden Keefe, Reversal of Fortune: The Lago Agrio Litigation, 1 STAN. J.
COMPLEX LiTIG. 199 (2013) (reprinting Patrick Radden Keefe, Reversal of Fortune, NEW
YORKER (Jan. 9, 2012)).
51. In re Estrada, 143 P.3d 731, 735-36 (N.M. 2006) (finding sanctionable discovery
misconduct by an attorney who was "consistently and forcefully instructed by out-of-state
counsel" and underscoring that "any attorney who is licensed to practice in this state
regardless of the pressures imposed when working with out-of-state counsel has an
independent duty to the New Mexico judiciary to obey New Mexico's ethical and discovery
rules").
52. McCann & Silverstein, supranote 35, at 261.
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public communication and will have a substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter." 53 The rule clearly
extends beyond cases in which an attorney is acting as attorney of record to
include cases in which the lawyer "has participated." Similarly, definitions of
"misconduct" in Model Rule 8.4 extend obligations to courts and the legal
54
system beyond activities specifically related to pending court proceedings.
As described above, it is uncertain under Model Rule 8.5 which ethical
rules could or should apply to attorney conduct in relation to foreign
proceedings when their role is primarily one of coordination. 55 Whatever rules
might apply as a technical matter, however, there are also significant questions
(analyzed above) about how these rules can provide meaningful guidance in the
complex setting of transnational litigation.
III.

SHIFTING POLITICAL SANDS

The ethical ambiguities and challenges described in the first two Parts are
worsened when transnational litigation involves legal systems that are known
for corruption and may have a questionable commitment to the rule of law.
These problems are also aggravated when legal proceedings become
politicized, as is the case when newly enacted procedural reforms are either illsuited or simply too new to be effectively managed in a legal system.
In Chevron, plaintiffs originally circumvented litigation at home in
Ecuador to seek justice in the United States. The main reasons for their choice
of forum are, by now, well-known-the availability of class actions,
contingency fees, extensive discovery, and punitive damages. Foreign
jurisdictions have not only permitted, but often encouraged, this kind of forum
shopping by their citizens. For example, in Bhopal the Government of India
first supported filing in the United States, and even resisted forum non
conveniens dismissal from U.S. courts. In a sign of more systemic support for
allowing aggrieved citizens to pursue their claims in U.S. courts, several Latin
American jurisdictions not only supported U.S. litigation to redress local

53.

MODEL RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT 3.6.

54. For example, Model Rule 8.4(d) provides that any "conduct that is prejudicial to
the administration ofjustice" is also professional misconduct.
55. Under the most standard interpretation of Model Rule 8.5, which provides choiceof-law rules for determining which ethical rules apply to professional conduct abroad, the

ethical rules of a foreign court control if an attorney is participating in proceedings in that
court. It is unclear whether, under Rule 8.5, the definition of a "matter" would include
foreign proceedings in Ecuador that arise out of the same facts as the litigation dismissed
from a U.S. court. One additional wrinkle is in New York, where lead counsel for plaintiff is
licensed, the ethics choice-of-law rule differs from Model Rule 8.5 and would make New
York ethical rules continue to apply to the professional conduct of a New York licensed
attorney in Ecuador. For this and other ambiguities in Model Rule 8.5, see Rogers, supra
note 20.
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injuries, but enacted legislation intended to prevent cases brought by their
citizens from being dismissed from U.S. courts under forum non conveniens.56
When high-profile cases were dismissed from U.S. courts, however,
foreign jurisdictions in several cases passed special legislation to allow local
plaintiffs some of the same procedural advantages they would have had in the
United States. For example, when the Bhopal case was ultimately dismissed,
the Government of India passed legislation to, among other things, facilitate
class procedures in Indian courts. In dismissing under forum non conveniens,
the court expressly relied on the fact that that the Indian legislature could enact
"a specific law for class actions" and the "Indian district court could adopt the
rule for use in a newly created class of injured [victims]." 5 7 Similarly, in class
action involving alleged harms to farm workers at Dole
Food Co., Nicaragua
58
enacted new legislation to facilitate litigation at home.
Coming back to Chevron, while the forum non conveniens motion was
pending in the district court for the Southern District of New York, Ecuador
enacted in 1999 the Environmental Management Law (the "EML"), apparently
at the behest of, or at least with the cooperation of, plaintiffs' counsel. 59 The
EML provided the legal basis for the case to be refiled in Ecuador if dismissed
in the United States. The legislation created a new private right of action for
damages for the cost of remediation of environmental harms. While the EML
did not create a conventional class action procedure, 60 it did create an analogue

56. Winston Anderson, Forum Non Conveniens Checkmated? The Emergence of
Retaliatory Legislation, 10 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 183, 184 (2001); Henry Saint Dahl,
Forum Non Conveniens, Latin America and Blocking Statutes, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REv. 21, 45 (2003); Walter W. Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens And Retaliatory Legislation:
The Impact On The Available Alternative Forum Inquiry And On The DesirabilityOf Forum
Non Conveniens As A Defense Tactic 56 U. KAN. L. REv. 609 (2008); Paul Santoyo,
Comment, Bananas of Wrath: How Nicaragua May Have Dealt Forum Non Conveniens a
Fatal Blow Removing the Doctrine as an Obstacle to Achieving Corporate Accountability,
27 Hous. J. INT'L L. 703, 724-26, 735-36 (2005); Jeff Todd, Phantom Torts andForum Non
Conveniens Blocking Statutes: Irony andMetonym in NicaraguanSpecial Law, 43 U. MAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 291 (2012).
57. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India 634 F. Supp. 842,
851 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
58. See Todd, supra note 56, at 292-93 (reporting on district court finding that U.S.

and Nicaraguan attorneys conspired to recruit plaintiffs with fraudulent work histories and
medical tests, to train plaintiffs to lie and to threaten and intimidate witnesses and
investigators).
59. According to the Associated Press, plaintiffs Ecuadorian counsel Bonifaz
indicated that "his team" had "worked with Ecuadorian lawyers to draft [the EML] similar to
the U.S. superfund law" and in contemplation of forum non conveniens dismissal from U.S.
courts. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)

60. Notably, some version of class action procedures have been introduced in various
Latin American countries. For a discussion of class action reform in Latin America, see
Samuel Issacharoff, The Governance Problem in Aggregate Litigation, 81 FORDHAM L. REv.
3165 (2013).
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for representational litigation, which also contemplated pre-trial discovery of a
type previously unfamiliar in Ecuadorian courts.
These improvised, ad hoc reforms differ from more sustained transnational
efforts at class action reform. Various jurisdictions around the world have been
debating, 6 1 and in many instances adopting, reforms to allow class and
aggregate litigation.62 These debates and reforms not only raise technical issues
about of rules of civil procedure, but "implicate fundamental values and often
rely on untested empirical assumptions.'' 6 3 Because class action and aggregate
litigation shifts quasi-legislative functions to unelected judges, it effectuates a
shift in the balance of power between courts and legislatures. 64 The
appropriateness of this shift in power is still debated in the United States. 65 In
systems that are less rights-focused and have less confidence in judicial
decision-making, such a shift may be inconsistent with existing constitutional
or political structures, less effective, or even counter-productive, at least in the
absence of other needed reforms.
Despite the need for caution, in response to forum non conveniens
dismissals in Bhopal, Chevron, and other cases, governments in plaintiffs'
home jurisdictions enacted reactionary procedural reforms to allow the cases to
proceed at home. Perhaps not coincidentally, in each instance, by the time of
forum non conveniens dismissal, the plaintiffs' cause had become a political
concern for the governments. In Ecuador, for example, the exit of the Texacofriendly military government, followed by the entrance of left-leaning populist
government, generated new political objectives in securing remedies for
victims of alleged harms.
The shift in political objectives compounds other political considerations.
In many cases involving claims against foreign investors, governments
themselves are directly implicated in the conduct underlying the merits of the
case and, thus, potentially in any resulting liability. Typical of any large-scale
foreign investment, particularly involving natural resources, 66 Ecuador was a

61. Deborah R. Hensler, The Globalization of Class Actions: An Overview, 622
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 7, 16 (2009) (arguing that "the United States has been
the leading model for class action adoption"); see also Debra Lyn Bassett, U.S. Class
Actions Go Global: TransnationalClass Actions and PersonalJurisdiction,72 FORDHAM L.
RFv. 41 (2003).
62. Hensler, supra note 61, at 13 (listing at least eighteen countries that have adopted
some form of class action, including "Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China,
Denmark, Finland, Indonesia, Israel, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, Taiwan").
63. See id.
64. Id. at 26 ("[C]lass or aggregate procedures also "implicate[]more fundamental

debate about the role of the courts in policy making in a representative democracy.").
65. See generally MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT (2009).

66. Frank J. Schuchat,

Cross-Cultural Ethical Issues In International Mineral
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joint venture partner with Texaco, just as India was a joint venture partner with
Union Carbide in Bhopal. 67 States were partners of the corporate defendants
and initially supportive, but also potentially liable when things went wrong.
In both these and other instances, by the time litigation was filed at home
under the newly minted procedural reforms, the political equation for these
partnerships had changed significantly, either as a result of backlash from the
case itself or as a result of larger political cycles, or both. The political shift
obviously held consequences for the corporate entities. However, it also meant
that judicial procedural reforms may not only have lacked systematic
evaluation and deliberative debate, but may have been enacted for overtly
political reasons.
Among the issues most debated in the United States regarding class actions
and aggregate litigation are the seemingly perverse incentives they can create
for plaintiffs' counsel and related ambiguities about class counsel's ethical
obligations. 68 As already analyzed above, some of these issues have been
addressed through statutory reforms and procedural innovations that aim at
monitoring and controlling perceived opportunities for excess and abuse by
plaintiffs' counsel. 69 Jurisdictions that hastily adopt legal reforms to allow class
or aggregate litigation have not had an opportunity to fine-tune the relevant
procedures to control for these concerns. The conclusions of a U.S. district
court, which found that the Nicaraguan reforms to permit class action litigation
against Dole were themselves responsible for encouraging an "industry" of
fraudulent claims, 70 seem to give voice to these concerns. These problems
perhaps should not be surprising in light of the fact, noted above, that these new
procedures must be administered by judges who have little or no experience
with, or resources for managing, the complex and often unwieldy issues that
can arise.
This highly politicized, legally fragile environment is necessarily ripe for
manipulation by foreign attorneys on both sides. Since normally plaintiffs are
the ones hoping to obtain a judgment that can be enforced abroad, they
arguably have a higher stake in maintaining some semblance of the rule of law

Development The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 44 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 9 (1998)
("In some countries local law requires government or quasi-government partnership in joint

ventures from foreign investments, especially where mineral rights are to be awarded.").
67. In addition to Ecuador and Texaco (now Chevron), and India and Union Carbide,
the Myanmar Government was partnered with Unocal and the government of Papua New
Guinea was partnered with Rio Tinto, among others.
68. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics andthe Settlements of Mass Torts: When the Rules
Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1162 (1995) ("Our current rules do not provide
adequate guidance for resolving these issues, either at the system level or at the individual
case level.")

69. Id. at 1172 (to ensure ethical settlements, "we must have either very strong process
protections or a deeper scrutiny of substantive outcomes in our settlement processes").
70. See Todd, supra note 56, at 293.
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and effective justice. Plaintiffs' counsel's commitment to the upholding the
integrity of the foreign legal system, in other words, should be of elevated
importance. However, for the reasons examined in Parts 1 and II, their formal
obligations to that legal system are not only tenuous, but virtually non-existent.
Moreover, as counsel new to transnational litigation, like an accidental tourist
or the Ugly American, 7 1 they may be all too willing to assume that antics
abroad simply don't count as lawyering or cannot affect them at home.
CONCLUSION

This Article has identified why transnational class and aggregate litigation
may create for plaintiffs' counsel unique ethical hazards. One lesson from
Chevron is that entrepreneurial lawyering in class actions is not delimited by
national boundaries, and that its movement across borders aggravates existing
agency costs and related risks. While many systems are debating,
experimenting with, and implementing new class procedures, few if any have
expressly contemplated the special challenges that arise when such cases
involve multiple legal systems and lawyers from different systems.
The recent Morrison and Kiobel decisions may mean that fewer such cases
are sustainable in U.S. federal courts, but attorneys and their clients will
undoubtedly still seek to use U.S. courts to hold U.S. corporations accountable
for alleged misdeeds abroad. Moreover, at a minimum, Chevron demonstrates
that discovery and enforcement may still occur in the U.S., even when cases on
the merits are brought in foreign jurisdictions. For these reasons, U.S. courts,
U.S. law, U.S. procedural traditions, and U.S. lawyers will remain important
features in transnational litigation and transnational legal practice.
These observations drive home another lesson from Chevron-that
regulatory and institutional frameworks have failed to address special problems
that arise in transnational class litigation or to provide guidance to an increasing
number of U.S. attorneys who engage in international and transnational legal
practice. As globalization has increased movement of goods, people and
services across borders, related legal claims and issues inevitably increased as
well. Many of those legal claims and issues implicate individuals and smaller
business entities. Litigation involving these claims inevitably involve smaller

71.

The Ugly American was a 1958 political novel by by Eugene Burdick and William

Lederer, which comments on U.S. adventurism abroad. One of the most memorable lines
from the book is by a Burmese journalist, who says "For some reason, the [American]
people I meet in my country are not the same as the ones I knew in the United States. A
mysterious change seems to come over Americans when they go to a foreign land. They
isolate themselves socially. They live pretentiously. They're loud and ostentatious." EUGENE
BURDICK & WILLIAM LEDERER, THE UGLY AMERICAN 145 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1999)
(1958).
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72
firms and more vulnerable clients.
More generally, the U.S. legal community sends thousands of U.S. trained
lawyers abroad, and now also trains thousands more foreign lawyers through
LLM programs. Given how it feeds attorneys into transnational legal practice,
and remains an important forum for international litigation, the U.S. must
undertake serious and sustained examination of what it means to be an
international lawyer. These are lawyers who operate in multiple systems, often
simultaneously.
When attorneys are engaged with multiple legal systems at one time, it is
an artificial oversimplification to imagine that they owe duties only to one
system at the expense of all others. True international lawyers often function as
shuttle diplomats among courts of various systems and as translators of legal
regimes and legal cultures for both their clients and courts. These unique
professional functions necessarily imply unique professional responsibilities.
Even ignoring its ambiguities, the crude train-track-switching choice-of-law
mechanism in Model Rule 8.5 utterly fails to acknowledge this complexity.
The ABA Ethics 20-20 Commission had an opportunity to amend Model
Rule 8.5 to redress some of these problems. It was presented with specific
proposed reforms to resolve issues that arise with respect to international
tribunals and parallel litigation. 73 Despite being constituted expressly for the
purpose of considering issues raised by globalization of legal practice,
however, it failed to do anything meaningful to rectify existing ambiguities to
redress structural problems with the Rule. 7 4 The ABA will hopefully rectify
this error sooner rather than later.
Clarifying the professional obligations of international lawyers may not
eliminate the problems that arose in Chevron and other similar cases. It would
be an important source, however, to aid attorneys, courts, and clients in
understanding how to engage the more difficult professional issues that arise in

72. See Carol Silver, Regulatory Mismatch in the Market for Legal Services, 23 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 487, 495 (2003) ("The international label is not claimed only by large law

firms; even small firms participate in this specialty."). This phenomenon is a logical
counterpart of the increased participation of smaller and medium-sized companies in the
global economy.
73. See Memorandum from Laurel S. Terry & Catherine A. Rogers to the ABA 20/20
Ethics Commission (June 12, 2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/ethics 2020/ethics 20 20 comments/terryandrodgers choiceoflawi
ncrossborderpracticeissuespaper.authcheckdam.pdf.
74. With regard to Rule 8.5, the only action taken was an amendment to a Comment
allowing some leeway on conflict of interest rules. About the Commission, ABA
COMMISSION

ON

ETHICS

20/20,

http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_

responsibility/aba commission on ethics 20 20.html (last visited July 16, 2013) ("Created
by then ABA President Carolyn B. Lamm in 2009, the Commission will perform a thorough
review of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the U.S. system of lawyer
regulation in the context of advances in technology and global legal practice
developments.").
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such contexts. More importantly, it would at least ensure that when such
calamities of justice occur, the response can be something other than a
collective shrug of bewilderment.

